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Microcredit, Institutional Investors, and MFIs 
 
Alicia Girón 
 
Abstract: My aim in this paper is to show the way in which microfinance acquires 
the face of women. While micro-finance institutions (MFIs) act under the flag of 
“serving the common good,” there are still the interests of institutional investors 
behind them, who are looking to profit through international financial circuits. On 
one hand, microfinance is part of financial innovation in the global financial 
circuits. On the other hand, women’s bancarization inserts them into the labor 
market, hence into the financial circuits. MFIs become part of the shadow financial 
system. When debating microcredit’s profitability from a gender perspective, I note 
both the financial effectiveness of microcredits and the role of women as highly 
profitable economic agents. Is there a relation between financialization and 
microcredit? Is microcredit an achievement that will improve the economic, 
political, and social environment for women? Why is it that women’s bancarization 
has been a priority of international financial organizations? Microcredit with a 
woman’s face confirms the suggested hypotheses. Their empowerment through 
microcredit is a new way for financial investors to obtain higher profits through 
MFIs. The highest interest rates that MFIs charges are an expression of 
financialization by institutional investors. 
 
Keywords: financialization, institutional investors, microfinance institutions, 
women 
 
JEL Classification Codes: D0, G15, G20, J16, O12 
 
As part of the financialization process, the shadow financial system has emerged 
around the world in different ways. It is not only part of the official dialogue within 
the macroeconomic field, but also within the microcredit sphere. Micro-finance 
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institutions (MFIs) are part of the financial process, especially when it comes to 
addressing the poor in developing countries. Most microcredits are given to women 
who need to improve their income, and they have been portrayed by the dominant 
ideology as a mechanism for women’s empowerment.1 Microcredit with a woman’s 
face is one of the most important metamorphoses that has come from the structural 
changes in financial and labor-market circuits since the late 1970s. Microcredit not 
only empowers women, but also leads them to becoming economically profitable 
subjects in microfinance services. At the same time, the profit obtained by MFIs is 
part of the financialization in international financial circuits. Many MFIs depend on, 
or are part of, big banks. 
 
Small Loans with a Woman’s Face 
 
When focusing on the analysis of microcredit, the high profitability of small loans, 
granted by MFIs at an international level, becomes noticeable (Rosenberg et al. 2013). 
Reducing poverty and improving the conditions of families are two elements of the 
normative discourse that highlights the role of women as economic agents through 
the access to funding granted by MFIs (Bateman and Ha-Jong 2012). Therefore, 
microcredit is the ideal way to obtain funding for starting small businesses. It is ideal 
to such an extent that even in the UN Millennium Development Goals the concepts 
of empowerment, women entrepreneurs, and microcredit are used to refer to women 
as economic agents. Hence, there is a close relation between empowerment, women 
entrepreneurs, and microcredit within the economic sphere of macro-economy, 
despite the fact that a great amount of microcredit is not created to generate new 
businesses, but to power daily consumption. 
There has been a transition, during the last four decades, from regulated to 
deregulated financial systems. This change has brought forth the integration of 
financial institutions into global circuits. The rapacious quest for profit and stock 
price appreciation indicative of “money manager capitalism” (Minsky [1986] 2008) 
has drawn money-center banks, giant pension funds, and other institutions into the 
microcredit sphere. As the relative importance of state and development banks has 
waned, microcredit operations are increasingly subject to the logic and imperatives of 
rentier capitalism (Keynes [1936] 1964). 
In most Latin American and Asian countries, institutional financial 
intermediaries have obtained great profits from MFIs (Girón 2012a). Through 
international financial markets, MFIs channeled liquidity toward funding small 
subsidiary loans from banking corporations that are classified as “too big to fail, too 
big to rescue.” These corporations have been favored by financial regulation from the 
state and from international financial agencies, such as the International Monetary 
1 Empowerment, from a gender perspective, consists of transforming women into economic agents — 
capable beings with “freedom to choose” not only how to use credit, but also to engage in productive 
projects as entrepreneurs in administrative, social, and political decision-making position. 
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Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS 2013),2 
and the central banks. According to the latter, the empowerment of women as 
entrepreneurs through microcredit is untenable. In a world of “money manager 
capitalism,”3 in which Minsky (Wray 2011) discerned the greed of financial 
institutions and in which financialization has become the norm, it can hardly be said 
that microcredit is the path to empowering women who live in an austere 
environment. 
Women are candidates for microcredit since it is the simplest way to include 
them in both labor markets and financial circuits, by making use of the important 
commitment they have to their families and their jobs. Therefore, the need for 
women to be income providers to their families brings about the transformation of 
societies by breaking traditional gender norms not only in managing money, but also 
in combatting gender discrimination both within the family and the workplace. 
NGOs, having recently emerged as a shadow of the state, offer credit and 
employment, as well as shape the production system in many societies (Karim 2011). 
The development of credit systems by NGOs started with the weakening of the state 
in the spheres of production and circulation. It was during the 1980s and 1990s that 
this model became surprisingly preeminent and influential when it came to making 
decisions related to economic policy. Under this pressure, patriarchal society began to 
break and the prerogative of development acquired great importance. In the 1960s, 
development was transformed into an organic process that aimed to raise the quality 
of life in a developing project to combat poverty on a global level. Microcredit, as 
referred to in the official discourse, assists this new model in eradicating poverty. 
Therefore, MFI regulation demands a new legal structure aimed at regulating credit 
relations between creditors and debtors, domestically as well as internationally. 
 
Profit Margins and Microcredit Profitability 
 
Using the World Bank’s data, I analyzed the profitability levels of fifteen MFIs with a 
large margin of profit at a global level by regions4 during 2012. I took into account 
those MFIs that, as borrowers, are located above 60 percent since, during that year, 
they reflect a profit margin above 65 percent (Table 1). However, there is the case of 
MEC le Sine with a profit margin of 209 percent. On average, the profit margin of 
the main, most profitable MFIs is 75 percent.  
 
2 BIS is located in Basilea, Switzerland.  
3 “Money manager capitalism” is defined as the changes that occur in the banking structure and the 
return to instability due to a characterization of capitalism based on securitization, globalization, 
financialization, deregulation, and liberalization (Tymoigne and Wray 2014, 72). 
4 The regions taken into account for this analysis are Latin America and the Caribbean, Southern 
Asia, Eastern Asia and the Pacific, Central Asia and Eastern Europe. 
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Table 1. Main MFIs by Profit Margin, 2012 
 
Source: Mixmarket (2012). 
Notes: ROA: Return on Assets (Net Operating Income, less Taxes)/Assets, average; ROE: Return on Capital (Net 
Operating Income, less Taxes)/Capital; Profit Margin: Net Operating Income/ Financial Revenue. 
 
Taking into account the available data, I made a regional analysis according to 
the World Bank’s classification. 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean involve seventeen countries,5 of which Mexico 
had the highest number of MFIs in this area with a total of sixty in 2012. For Mexico, 
this number is equivalent to 16 percent of the total MFIs established within the 
region, followed by Peru and Ecuador with 15 and 12 percent of the total, respectively 
(Figure 1). The distribution of assets within the region differs. Peru had the highest 
amount of assets with 32 percent of the total, followed by Colombia and Mexico with 
21 and 12 percent, respectively (Figure 2). 
 
Name Country 
Women 
borrowers % 
Assets 
(thousands of $) 
ROA 
% 
ROE 
% 
Profit 
margin % 
MEC le Sine Senegal 
 
547,773 23 101 209 
Hope Russia Russia 79 449,951 11 11 88 
MF Nadejda Russia 79 449,951 11 11 88 
Inam Azerbaijan 33 13,415 6.0 6.0 87 
Alcaravan Colombia 61 7,573,055 26 43 86 
CCC Ecuador 42 3,319,228 10 13 84 
Rishenglong China 15 22,994,732 8.0 11 78 
Ochir-Undraa OMZ Mongolia 41 4,872,000 6.0 9.0 72 
Fundación Paraguaya Paraguay 86 30,510,006 20 76 67 
TEDC Iraq 
 
6,589,490 16 16 67 
JSJRMCC China 
 
95,782,744 8 12 67 
Amalkom Iraq 
 
7,606,743 41 48 67 
UCEC-G Chad 
 
3,010,413 7.0 19 66 
BTV Vietnam 87 311,757 12 12 66 
Guarantee Agency 
of Nizhniy Novgorod 
Russia 20 17,383,426 5.0 6.0 65 
 
5 For this region and because of the existent MFIs, Mixmarket only takes into account the following 
countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, 
Santa Lucia, Suriname and Trinity, and Tobago. 
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Figure 1. MFIs’ Distribution by Country, Latin America and the Caribbean, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mixmarket (2012).  
 
Figure 2. MFIs’ Asset Concentration by Country, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mixmarket (2012). 
Mexico 16%
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Of the fifteen MFIs, whose profit margin in Latin America and the Caribbean 
was highest, seven granted more than 50 percent of their credit to women and showed 
a profit margin above 50 percent (Table 2). Three of the fifteen MFIs are located in 
Colombia, alongside the MFI with the largest profit margin — Alcaravan (this MFI 
granted six out of every ten loans to women). Thirteen out of the fifteen main MFIs 
granted over 60 percent of their credit to women. The case of FIACG, in Guatemala, 
stands out since 100 percent of its loans were granted to women, generating a profit 
margin of 34 percent, a ROA of 13 percent, and a return on equity (ROE) of 14 
percent. On average, the indicator for the fifteen MFIs is 17 percent ROA and 34 
percent ROE. The MFIs with the highest percentage of credit granted to women were 
Compartamos Banco and Invirtiendo, both Mexican, with 94 and 93 percent, 
respectively. 
 
Table 2. Main MFIs in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2012 
 
Profit Margin 
Name Country 
Women 
borrowers % 
Assets 
(thousands of $) 
ROA 
% 
Profit 
margin % 
Alcaravan Colombia 61 7,573,055 26 86 
CCC Ecuador 42 3,319,228 10 84 
Fundación Paraguaya Paraguay 86 30,510,006 20 67 
FUNDEVI Honduras 46 100,802,289 6.0 59 
LICU Belize 
 
19,835,918 6.0 55 
Invirtiendo Mexico 93 32,012,269 19 52 
FOVIDA Peru 
 
2,507,512 11 50 
APACOOP Costa Rica 26 4,162,935 7.0 46 
Fundación Mundo Mujer Colombia 64 480,471,143 17 45 
FUNDESCAT Colombia 56 3,632,513 9.0 43 
IPED Guyana Guyana 34 13,959,317 8.0 42 
Financia Credit Panamá 2 3,571,088 7.0 41 
MCN Haiti 64 24,121,586 17 40 
CREDIOESTE Brazil 24 2,830,603 17 38 
MUDE Guatemala 91 1,981,227 9.0 37 
ROA 
Name Country 
Women 
borrowers % 
Assets 
(thousands of $) 
ROA 
% 
Profit 
margin % 
ACCESS Jamaica 57 9,527,859 29 36 
Alcaravan Colombia 61 7,573,055 26 86 
Fundación Paraguaya Paraguay 86 30,510,006 20 67 
Invirtiendo Mexico 93 32,012,269 19 52 
Fundación Mundo Mujer Colombia 64 480,471,143 17 45 
CEAPE MA Brazil 67 22,912,912 17 33 
CREDIOESTE Brazil 24 2,830,603 17 38 
MCN Haiti 64 24,121,586 17 40 
ASEI El Salvador 83 3,617,474 15 33 
Compartamos Banco Mexico 94 1,333,796,296 13 31 
FIACG Guatemala 100 3,495,906 13 34 
Fundación Adelante Honduras 99 1,460,022 13 22 
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Table 2 continued 
 
Source: Mixmarket (2012).   
Notes: ROA: Return on Assets (Net Operating Income, less Taxes)/Assets, average; ROE: Return on Capital (Net 
Operating Income, less Taxes)/Capital average; Profit Margin: Net Operating Income/ Financial Revenue.  
 
Southern Asia 
 
Southern Asia comprises seven countries:6 India involved 93 MFIs, the highest 
number in this region; Bangladesh 28; Nepal 24; and Pakistan 23. The distribution by 
number of institutions is as follows: India 51 percent, Bangladesh 15 percent, Nepal 
13 percent, and Pakistan 13 percent. Together, the last three countries represent 41 
percent, while the other MFIs are located in Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, and Bhutan 
(Figure 3). 
In relation to the concentration of assets, India stands out with 45 percent 
(4,524 million dollars) of the total for that region. It is followed by Bangladesh with 
35 percent (3,513 million dollars). Together, these countries represented 80 percent 
of the total assets during 2012 (Figure 4). 
6 For this region and because of the existent MFIs, Mixmarket only takes into account the following 
countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
FIACG Guatemala 100 3,495,906 13 34 
Fundación Adelante Honduras 99 1,460,022 13 22 
ECLOF - DOM Dominican R. 80 6,578,954 13 30 
Avanzar Argentina 65 352,080 12 15 
Financiera CIA Mexico 82 2,759,949 12 25 
ROE 
Name Country 
Women 
borrowers % 
Assets 
(thousands of $) 
ROE 
% 
Profit 
margin % 
FUNDESER Nicaragua 50 20,267,041 115 86 
Fundación Paraguaya Paraguay 86 30,510,006 76 84 
ECLOF - DOM Dominican R. 80 6,578,954 71 67 
ACCESS Jamaica 57 9,527,859 44 59 
Alcaravan Colombia 61 7,573,055 43 55 
Apoyo Económico Mexico 56 103,648,367 39 52 
Financiera Edyficar Peru 
 
1,064,706,594 38 20 
Santander Microcrédito Brazil 69 11,398,537 36 46 
CRAC Los Andes Peru 
 
50,960,794 35 45 
MCN Haiti 64 24,121,586 34 43 
Fundación Mundo Mujer Colombia 64 480,471,143 33 42 
Fundación Alternativa Ecuador 55 18,542,773 32 41 
Compartamos Banco Mexico 94 1,333,796,296 31 40 
Invirtiendo Mexico 93 32,012,269 30 38 
CREDIOESTE Brazil 24 2,830,603 30 37 
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Figure 3. MFIs’ Distribution by Country, Southern Asia, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mixmarket (2012). 
 
Figure 4. MFIs’ Asset Concentration by Country, Southern Asia, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mixmarket (2012). 
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The fifteen MFIs with the highest profit margin in this region had relatively high 
percentages of loans granted to women (Table 3). Eight out of the fifteen MFIs 
granted the total of their credit to women. The fifteen showed a profit margin above 
20 and 60 percent. The case of India stands out since this country had four of the 
fifteen MFIs presented in Table 3. These four enterprises also granted 100 percent of 
their credit to women. The same table shows that fifteen MFIs with higher ROA 
granted more than the 80 percent of their credit to women. In eight of them, the 
percentage reaches 100, which also happened among the main MFIs by ROE, since 
fourteen out of fifteen MFIs granted more than 80 percent of their credit to women. 
Out of these, nine had a credit portfolio dominated by women. These are established 
in India, Bangladesh, and Nepal. 
 
Table 3. Main MFIs in Southern Asia, 2012 
 
Profit Margin 
Name Country 
Women 
borrowers % 
Assets 
(thousands of $) 
ROA 
% 
Profit 
margin % 
Jagaran MF India 100 8,079,211 10 61 
Nilkhantha SACCOS Nepal 100 285,241 7.0 44 
VERC Bangladesh 98 13,478,720 9.0 41 
ASA Pakistan Pakistan 100 16,190,580 9.0 40 
Muthoot India 100 59,924,357 10 38 
Bandhan India 100 982,599,687 5.0 34 
Muktinath Bikas 
Bank Limited 
Nepal 100 6,774,990 7.0 33 
VYCCU Nepal 24 4,627,715 4.0 33 
BDBL Bhutan 38 140,276,781 4.0 33 
BMSCCSL Nepal 
 
401,509 6.0 33 
TMSS Bangladesh 98 119,083,892 7.0 32 
Sarala India 100 7,364,865 6.0 31 
RCDS Pakistan 92 7,647,750 8.0 30 
Sahara Mahila Nepal 100 503,667 4.0 30 
NRSP Pakistan 79 73,671,819 7.0 29 
ROA 
Name Country 
Women 
borrowers % 
Assets 
(thousands $) 
ROA 
% 
Profit 
margin % 
Muthoot India 100 59,924,357 10 38 
Jagaran MF India 100 8,079,211 10 61 
ASA Pakistan Pakistan 100 16,190,580 9.0 40 
VERC Bangladesh 98 13,478,720 9.0 41 
Lak Jaya Sri Lanka 100 3,658,843 8.0 27 
RCDS Pakistan 92 7,647,750 8.0 30 
Nilkhantha SACCOS Nepal 100 285,241 7.0 44 
NRSP Pakistan 79 73,671,819 7.0 29 
Muktinath Bikas 
Bank Limited 
Nepal 100 6,774,990 7.0 33 
TMSS Bangladesh 98 119,083,892 7.0 32 
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Table 3 continued 
 
Source: Mixmarket (2012).  
Notes: ROA: Return on Assets (Net Operating Income, less Taxes)/Assets, average; ROE: Return on Capital (Net 
Operating Income, less Taxes)/Capital average; Profit Margin: Net Operating Income/ Financial Revenue. 
Sarala India 100 7,364,865 6.0 31 
RCDS Pakistan 92 7,647,750 8.0 30 
Sahara Mahila Nepal 100 503,667 4.0 30 
NRSP Pakistan 79 73,671,819 7.0 29 
ROA 
Name Country 
Women 
borrowers % 
Assets 
(thousands $) 
ROA 
% 
Profit 
margin % 
Muthoot India 100 59,924,357 10 38 
Jagaran MF India 100 8,079,211 10 61 
ASA Pakistan Pakistan 100 16,190,580 9.0 40 
VERC Bangladesh 98 13,478,720 9.0 41 
Lak Jaya Sri Lanka 100 3,658,843 8.0 27 
RCDS Pakistan 92 7,647,750 8.0 30 
Nilkhantha SACCOS Nepal 100 285,241 7.0 44 
NRSP Pakistan 79 73,671,819 7.0 29 
Muktinath Bikas 
Bank Limited 
Nepal 100 6,774,990 7.0 33 
TMSS Bangladesh 98 119,083,892 7.0 32 
Manushi Nepal 100 2,212,828 6.0 24 
BRAC Bangladesh 96 788,944,880 6.0 23 
GJUS Bangladesh 90 3,375,898 6.0 26 
Sarala India 100 7,364,865 6.0 31 
BMSCCSL Nepal 
 
401,509 6.0 33 
ROE 
Name Country 
Women 
borrowers % 
Assets 
(thousands of $) 
ROE 
% 
Profit 
margin % 
Kashf Foundation Pakistan 100 46,058,595 767 7.0 
GMF India 100 440,256 130 3.0 
Muthoot India 100 59,924,357 93 38 
SOLVE Nepal 100 1,133,988 72 20 
SKDRDP India 62 446,615,297 70 17 
Muktinath Bikas 
Bank Limited 
Nepal 100 6,774,990 69 33 
Manushi Nepal 100 2,212,828 57 24 
GMSSS India 100 1,001,582 44 27 
DAMEN Pakistan 100 9,336,549 36 17 
MMFL India 100 33,565,674 35 25 
VERC Bangladesh 98 13,478,720 34 41 
TMSS Bangladesh 98 119,083,892 34 32 
SKS Foundation, Bangladesh Bangladesh 97 12,717,506 33 15 
BURO Bangladesh Bangladesh 87 187,056,662 32 15 
Annapurna Mahila 
Credit Co-op Society 
India 96 7,006,557 32 9.0 
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Eastern Asia and the Pacific 
 
Eastern Asia and the Pacific region comprises ten countries.7 China was the 
country with the highest number of established MFIs and a total of forty financial 
intermediaries, which is equivalent to 28 percent of the total MFIs within the region 
in 2012. By comparison, during the same year, Vietnam was represented by twenty-
four MFIs. In Figure 5, MFIs’ distribution among the countries of that region is 
observed. In what refers to the distribution of assets, China had the highest number — 
81 percent of the total within the region, followed by Vietnam with the 12 percent 
(Figure 6). 
 
Figure 5. MFIs’ Distribution by Country, Eastern Asia and the Pacific, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mixmarket (2012). 
 
 
7 For this region, Mixmarket only takes into account the following countries: Cambodia, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Laos, Papua New Guinea, China, Samoa, East Timor, Tongues, and Vietnam. 
People's Republic of 
China 28%
Vietnam 24%Philippines 16%
Cambodia 11%
Laos 11%
Indonesia 5%
East Timor 2%
Others 3%
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Figure 6. MFIs’ Asset Concentration by Country, Eastern Asia and the Pacific, 
2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mixmarket (2012). 
 
Table 4 shows the fifteen MFIs with the highest profit margin within Eastern 
Asia and the Pacific. Out of these, eight granted more than 70 percent of their credit 
to women. Two cases are worth mentioning: (i) China had six of the fifteen MFIs in 
this region, and (i) Vietnam gathered eight out of fifteen. Together, these countries 
concentrated fourteen out of fifteen MFIs within their territories, with the largest 
margins of profit in the Eastern Asia and the Pacific region. Table 4 also shows the 
fifteen MFIs with higher ROA, and in eleven of them, the credit portfolio comprised 
70 percent women; among the MFIs with higher ROE, six granted the total of their 
credit to women. 
 
Central Asia and Eastern Europe 
 
Central Asia and Eastern Europe comprise twenty-one countries,8 and most of 
the region’s MFIs were established in Tajikistan during 2012 (Figure 7). This country 
People's Republic of 
China 81%
Vietnam 12%
Cambodia 5%
Philippines 1%
Others 1%
8 For this region and because of the existent MFIs, Mixmarket only takes into account the following 
countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, 
Kirgizstan, Macedonia, Moldavia, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Tajikistan, 
Turkey, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
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concentrated thirty-two of the MFIs, which is equivalent to 17 percent of the total. 
However, assets were concentrated in Azerbaijan and Mongolia, representing 21 and 
19 percent of the total, respectively (Figure 8). The other countries of this region 
showed a number that was below 10 percent. 
Table 5 contains the fifteen MFIs with the highest profit margin in Central Asia 
and Eastern Europe. Six of these granted more than the 50 percent of their credit to 
women and had a profit margin above 53 percent. In terms of ROA, eight of the 
main fifteen MFIs granted less than 60 percent of their credit to women and only 
three granted more than 80 percent to women. Asian Credit Fund (ACF), established 
in Kazakhstan, granted 100 percent of their credit to women, and their ROE 
represented a value near 100 percent as well. 
In conclusion, the Central Asia and Eastern Europe region granted less credit to 
women. South Asia was the region with the highest percentage of credit granted to 
women, within which India stands out since, according to the available data about 
this country, it had the highest amount of MFIs that granted 100 percent of their 
credit to women. In Latin America and the Caribbean region, several countries did 
not presented any data, but, under these restrictions Mexico stands out since many of 
its MFIs granted a 100 percent of their credit to women in 2012. The MFIs 
established in Eastern Asia and the Pacific region granted over 70 percent of their 
credit to women. 
 
Table 4. Main MFIs in Eastern Asia and the Pacific, 2012 
 
 
Profit Margin 
Name Country 
Women 
borrowers % 
Assets 
(thousands of $) 
ROA 
% 
Profit 
margin % 
Rishenglong China 15 22,994,732 8.0 78 
JSJRMCC China 
 
95,782,744 8.0 67 
BTV Vietnam 87 311,757 13 66 
Credit & Savings Project- 
Women Union 
Vietnam 100 427,687 9.0 60 
Guangxi Longlin China 29 324,204 3.0 54 
IPR Cambodia 41 6,470,428 13 53 
Sichuan Xinfu MCC China 
 
185,181,446 5.0 51 
Women Economic 
Development Fund-HCM 
Vietnam 100 2,164,539 7.0 49 
ChildFund Hoa Binh Vietnam 100 732,428 
 
47 
Dariu Vietnam 100 2,853,812 12 47 
SEDA Vietnam 100 1,193,867 9.0 47 
HanHua China 
 
119,950,010 9.0 47 
PNN Soc Son Vietnam 100 416,644 27 46 
CAFPE BR-VT Vietnam 70 1,976,935 10 45 
MicroCred-Nanchong China 25 40,561,634 7.0 42 
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Table 4 continued 
 
 
Source: Mixmarket (2012).  
Notes: ROA: Return on Assets (Net Operating Income, less Taxes)/Assets, average; ROE: Return on Capital (Net 
Operating Income, less Taxes)/Capital average; Profit Margin: Net Operating Income/ Financial Revenue.  
 
MicroCred-Nanchong China 25 40,561,634 7.0 42 
ROA 
Name Country 
Women 
borrowers % 
Assets 
(thousands of $) 
ROA 
% 
Profit 
margin % 
PNN Soc Son Vietnam 100 416,644 27 46 
SCU Luang Prabang Laos 61 271,702 14 40 
IPR Cambodia 41 6,470,428 13 53 
Dariu Vietnam 100 2,853,812 12 47 
BTV Vietnam 87 311,757 12 66 
WFDF Laos 100 1,108,359 11 34 
ASKI Philippines 73 47,141,013 11 27 
M7 DB District Vietnam 100 329,741 10 41 
CAFPE BR-VT Vietnam 70 1,976,935 10 45 
SEDA Vietnam 100 1,193,867 9.0 47 
Credit & Savings Project- 
Women Union 
Vietnam 100 427,687 9.0 60 
M7 Ninh Phuoc Vietnam 100 478,788 9.0 40 
M7 DBP City Vietnam 85 663,537 9.0 33 
HanHua China 
 
119,950,010 9.0 47 
BMT Sanama Indonesia 34 723,738 9.0 31 
ROE 
Name Country 
Women 
borrowers % 
Assets 
(thousands of $) 
ROE 
% 
Profit 
margin % 
PATRA Hunchun China 100 618,973 138 26 
ASKI Philippines 73 47,141,013 65 27 
BMT Sanama Indonesia 34 723,738 60 31 
Credit & Savings Project- 
Women Union 
Vietnam 100 427,687 47 60 
PNN Soc Son Vietnam 100 416,644 44 46 
SCU Luang Prabang Laos 61 271,702 35 40 
ASA Philippines Philippines 100 52,853,533 33 11 
CARD Bank Philippines 97 100,378,696 32 24 
SPBD Tonga Tonga 100 2,128,683 31 20 
M7 Uong bi Vietnam 90 1,476,514 30 29 
ACLEDA Cambodia 
 
1,908,178,016 30 37 
EMI Laos 83 2,892,433 30 11 
CEP Vietnam 75 59,345,980 29 40 
PRASAC Cambodia 77 251,259,169 28 33 
MBK Ventura Indonesia 100 39,360,395 28 14 
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Figure 7. MFIs’ Distribution by Country, Central Asia and Eastern Europe, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mixmarket (2012). 
 
Figure 8. MFIs’ Asset Concentration by Country, Central Asia and Eastern Europe, 
2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mixmarket (2012). 
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Table 5. Main MFIs in Central Asia and Eastern Europe, 2012 
 
Profit Margin 
Name Country 
Women 
borrowers % 
Assets 
(thousands of $) 
ROA 
% 
Profit 
margin % 
Hope Russia Russia 79 449,951 11 88 
MF Nadejda Russia 79 449,951 11 88 
Inam Azerbaijan 33 13,415 6.0 87 
Ochir-Undraa OMZ Mongolia 41 4,872,000 6.0 72 
Garantee Agency 
of Nizhniy Novgorod 
Russia 20 17,383,426 5.0 65 
Netcapital Mongolia 50 5,264,205 32 63 
Maximum Kazakhstan 0 75,468,120 5.0 63 
BID NBFI Mongolia 59 6,925,016 19 61 
Transcapital Mongolia 
 
5,752,496 17 60 
Ehyoi kuhiston Tajikistan 
 
499,975 
 
60 
AREGAK UCO Armenia 76 32,033,555 13 59 
Avrasiya-Kredit Azerbaijan 51 2,406,728 18 53 
Regional MC Russia 
 
4,911,595 4.0 52 
Caucasus Credit Azerbaijan 29 924,499 18 52 
Easycred Georgia 47 5,574,113 15 51 
ROA 
Name Country 
Women 
borrowers % 
Assets 
(thousands of $) 
ROA 
% 
Profit 
margin % 
Netcapital Mongolia 50 5,264,205 32 63 
ACF Kazakhstan 100 7,965,149 29 49 
BID NBFI Mongolia 59 6,925,016 19 61 
Caucasus Credit Azerbaijan 29 924,499 18 52 
Avrasiya-Kredit Azerbaijan 51 2,406,728 18 53 
MLF ZAR Tajikistan 
 
533,508 17 42 
Transcapital Mongolia 
 
5,752,496 17 60 
Barakat Uzbekistan 63 266,445 16 47 
Easycred Georgia 47 5,574,113 15 51 
Salym Finance Kyrgyzstan 49 3,725,717 14 46 
Tadbirkor Invest Uzbekistan 88 209,754 13 25 
AREGAK UCO Armenia 76 32,033,555 13 59 
Mikro ALDI 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
49 2,574,492 12 46 
Bereke Kazakhstan 89 8,443,893 12 37 
Viator Azerbaijan 39 18,224,113 11 33 
ROE 
Name Country 
Women 
borrowers % 
Assets 
(thousands of $) 
ROE 
% 
Profit 
margin % 
ACF Kazakhstan 100 7,965,149 410 49 
Regional MC Russia 
 
4,911,595 90 52 
Bank Eskhata Tajikistan 36 149,691,597 59 31 
Netcapital Mongolia 50 5,264,205 56 63 
BID NBFI Mongolia 59 6,925,016 54 61 
Bank of Baku Azerbaijan 
 
623,308,974 49 41 
CREDO Georgia 41 108,659,036 46 27 
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Table 5 continued 
 
 
Source: Mixmarket (2012). 
Notes: ROA: Return on Assets (Net Operating Income, less Taxes)/Assets, average; ROE: Return on Capital (Net 
Operating Income, less Taxes)/Capital average; Profit Margin: Net Operating Income/ Financial Revenue. 
 
A Successful Model to Obtain Profits 
 
During August 2010, SKS Microfinance Limited, an enterprise located in Hyderabad, 
India, granted small loans to poor women and collected 350 million dollars at an 
initial public auctioned. The impressive debut on the stock market seemed to confirm 
that microfinance — loaning money to the poor who do not have enough access to 
formal loans from banks — might transform into something profitable and sufficiently 
attractive for investors. Other MFIs from India would follow the path of SKS and its 
rapid profitable growth (Kazmin 2011). In an article, “Microfinance Poor Service: 
Tiny Loans are Getting More Expensive,” The Economist referred to the fact that, 
during the last several years, small loans have had a very high cost. For 1,500 MFIs 
around the world, the interest rates for small loans of 150 dollars or lower had 
increased from an average of 30 percent in 2004 to 35 percent in 2011 (Economist 
2014). 
Criticism of this micro-financing model has increased. Milford Bateman (2010) 
points out that microcredit as employment generator, aimed at alleviating poverty, 
actually increases risks, although it promotes development from below, empowers the 
poor, and increases communal solidarity, all elements of a tenable project. The central 
criticism is that microfinance has the opposite effect of reducing poverty since 
microcredit does not work when trying to generate a sustainable dignified 
environment for a community. The right to water, family, healthcare, and education, 
do not get satisfied by microfinance alone. That is, microfinance does not suffice for 
creating the infrastructure of services that communities need. The benefits through 
microcredit to the poor are few, many communities remain structurally fragile, and 
poverty is still increasing. Bateman’s study (2013), in short, questions the 
conventional wisdom of the usefulness of microcredit. 
The benefits of microcredit have been widely oversold, so that the financing-for-
development discourse on the part of financial institutions has encouraged financial 
Bank of Baku Azerbaijan 
 
623,308,974 49 41 
CREDO Georgia 41 108,659,036 46 27 
Azercredit Azerbaijan 34 65,123,744 45 25 
ICA Azerbaijan 37 19,981,806 44 6 
MLO HUMO Tajikistan 45 19,409,472 39 29 
FINCA-AZE Azerbaijan 32 166,600,000 38 28 
LTD MFO Capital Credit Georgia 38 808,896 38 14 
LOK Microcredit Foundation 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
33 44,300,676 37 14 
FINCA-GEO Georgia 39 59,904,184 35 26 
Parabank Azerbaijan 31 133,233,333 35 22 
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inclusion as the axis of economic development in society. The “bancarization” 
imperative implies that society should make an ever-increasing use of financial services 
offered by institutions near their location. It is believed that by guaranteeing a higher 
financial inclusion, a country will be most prosperous, which does not seem to be the 
case, especially when pointing out the cost of loans9 and the high interest for loans 
granted to those clients from the bottom of the population’s pyramid. Between 2005 
and 2006, the interest rates for personal loans within the microfinance sector in 
Mexico fluctuated between 23 and 103 percent on average. At the same time, credit 
institutions for consumption charged a 77 percent interest, while the interest on 
credit cards of the main banks ranged between 27 and 75 percent, with the average 
national level resting at 48 percent (Rosenberg 2007). Beyond the presumed 
benevolence of these microfinance institutions, there is an increased charge when it 
comes to interest.10 
It is worth observing that the development of humanitarian organizations, such 
as CARE,11 transformed into MFIs, which defends human dignity and fights poverty. 
CARE started in Peru in 1997 with an initial investment of 3.5 million U.S. dollars, 
and was later bought by the Bank of Credit for 96 million dollars. 
The microfinance industry represents over sixty billion dollars. NGOs serve 35 
percent of all clients, while credit unions and rural banks serve only 5.0 percent. 
Compartamos,12 which started as an NGO and generated 458 million dollars during a 
public auction in 2007, is one of the largest institutions in the western hemisphere, 
with 2.2 million active clients. This MFI charged 82 percent for management and 
interest during 2008. Nigeria’s Lift Above Poverty Organization (LABO)13 also charges 
excessive interest, and grants most of its credit to women. 
9 The average interbank interest rate in Mexico was relatively low, almost 8.0 percent in 2008. The 
fundamental cause is the administrative, rather than funding cost. Another Mexican group that plays an 
important role in the expansion of transparency through financial education is Prodesarrollo, a network of 
forty-six subsidiaries of IMFs, NGOs, and banks which, together, served more than 1.3 million low-income 
clients during 2007. The network uses financial education campaigns, employer incentives, and consumers 
satisfaction evaluations to promote financial education (Centro para la Inclusión Financiera 2009, 32) 
10 An example is Te Creemos, with annual average rate of 125 percent (Macfarquhar 2010). 
11 CARE receives support from various financial institutions for its pioneering work in microfinance. 
For example, Barclays, CARE International, and Plan International (USA), have joined in an initiative to 
enhance the quality of life of the poor through widening and developing their access to basic financial 
services. The initiative brought together the resources of each organization in Africa, Asia, and South 
America (CARE 2014). 
12 Compartamos was born as an MFI and later transformed into a bank in Mexico. 
13 Lift Above Poverty Organization (LAPO) is an institution that grants microcredit. Its activities 
started in 1987 and it registered as a NGO in 1993. In Nigeria, it is related to the Grameen Bank. Its 
funding comes mainly from the Evangelischer Entwicklungsdientes (EED) — a German service for the 
development of evangelical churches, USAID, and the Grameen Foundation. LAPO is an MFI funded by 
the Deutsche Bank and the Calvert Foundation. 
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MFIs’ interest rates vary around the world, generating substantial profits for loan 
providing entities. The United States House Committee on Financial Services14 has 
been concerned with the substantial profits of these ventures. Rates vary from one 
country to another. It is very important to take into account the cases of Nigeria and 
Mexico since the credit offers and interest rates MFIs from these countries charge are 
very high and above the formal financial systems’ average. An example of the latter 
may be the average interest rate charged by microfinance institutions of — at least, in 
Mexico — 70 percent or more as compared to the global average of 37 percent (U.S. 
Committee on Financial Services 2010). 
 
Institutional Investors and MFIs  
 
One of the questions to be delved into when investigating MFIs and microcredit is: 
Where do the funds to finance those who do not meet the credit requirements within 
formal financial circuits come from? Banks and institutional investors dominate loans 
and their profits exceed 100 percent. Muhammad Yunus himself stated that “we 
created microcredit to fight the loan sharks; we didn’t create microcredit to encourage 
new loan sharks … Microcredit should be seen as an opportunity to help people get 
out of poverty in a business way, but not as an opportunity to make money out of 
poor people” (United Nations News Centre 2006). 
JP Morgan Chase invested money in CARE to grant loans to those families that 
were devastated by the 2004 tsunami in India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. 
The purpose of the project was for MFIs to help families and communities in 
rebuilding their infrastructure through entrepreneurial development. At an 
institutional level, CARE has supported the creation, development, and strengthening 
of many MFIs throughout Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Its goal is to develop and 
improve the ability of MFIs to obtain financial and non-financial services, intended to 
impact the poor in an effective, long-term, and tenable manner. MFIs provide loans 
for machinery and work capital to small and micro-businesses that are frequently 
larger and more formal than those groups that receive savings and loan services. One 
of these is the Development Entity of Small and Micro Enterprises (known as 
EDYFICAR, in Spanish), created by CARE in Peru in 1998. EDYFICAR offers a 
variety of financial products, including personal and group loans to the poor. 
EDYFICAR has been so successful that it has become a leading microfinance 
institution in Peru with a loan portfolio of around $200 million and with 1,170 
employees serving over 195,000 clients across thirteen Peruvian regions. The Inter-
American Development Bank ranked this institution ninth among all MFIs in Latin 
America. 
14 The United States House Committee on Financial Services (referred to as House Banking 
Committee) is the committee of the United States House of Representatives that supervises the financial 
industry, including values, insurances, banks, and the mortgage industry. The committee also supervises the 
Federal Reserve, the Treasury Department, the Securities, the Exchange Commission, and other regulators 
of financial services. 
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At a global level, and since the lack of access to commercial sources of capital is 
still a grave obstacle to the development of many MFIs, CARE helped in the creation 
of MicroVest — an investment fund that specializes in gathering and providing capital 
to smaller and growing MFIs. MicroVest has invested over eighty million dollars in 
thirty-seven MFIs across sixteen countries since it began its operation in 2003. 
It is important to mention that as the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) of the 
Inter-American Development Bank, the Inter-American Investment Corporation 
(IIC), the Andean Development Corporation (CAF), and private investors, are 
participating in funding the Microfinance Growth Fund (MiGroF),15 a new credit 
mechanism for MFIs in Latin America and the Caribbean. Among the main partners 
in this initiative is Banamex, a major commercial bank of Mexico, which joined the 
MiGroF for Latin America and the Caribbean. This institution would provide 250 
million U.S. dollars in loans to medium and long-term MFIs throughout the region, 
offering funding in local currencies as well as in U.S. dollars. The Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC) committed to providing 125 million U.S. dollars. 
Banamex, a subsidiary of Citibank, joined MiGroF as investor and partner, but it is 
also expected to participate in its corporate governance. When creating this MFI, it 
was announced that OPIC, Multilateral Investment Fun (MIF), member of the 
Interamerican Development Bank (IDB), and IIC, would work together to launch a 
new source of funding for Latin American MFIs, which had had to reduce their 
portfolios and credit availability as a consequence of the global financial crisis of 
2008. MIF would provide ten million dollars to the new mechanism, IIC would 
contribute up to five million dollars, and CAF would give ten million dollars. The 
private investor partners of MiGroF, besides Banamex, are the Norwegian 
Microfinance Initiative (NMI), ACCION International, and BlueOrchard (Rozas 
2012). 
MIF and IIC had a very active role in structuring the MiGroF, as well as in 
defining its credit strategy. They also engineered the process through which the 
management of MiGroF passed on to the Swiss investments’ manager BlueOrchard 
Finance A.S. As the president of both the IDB and IIC directory, Luis Alberto 
Moreno, put it, “this new source of funding is not only going to help MFIs to recover 
the credit availability they had before suffering the effects of the global financial crisis, 
but will also help in what refers to the growth of the microenterprise sector, which is 
the key for economic growth and a source of employment in many countries of the 
region” (BID 2010). 
15 The objective of the MiGroF is to supply funds to MFIs, so that they are able to widen their loan 
portfolios, and to facilitate a sustained growth of the micro- and small enterprises level. When the U.S. 
presidency announced MiGroF in April 2009, during its participation in the Fifth Summit of the Americas, 
in the Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, the U.S. government saw this fund as a necessity to close 
possible gaps that had resulted from the global financial crisis. 
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Institutional investors, such as pension and hedge funds, have permeated MFIs. 
Dutch pension funds like Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds (ABP)16 and Pension 
Fund for Care and Wellbeing (PGGM)17 invested in Dexia18 in order to channel their 
investments through BlueOrchard and Microfinance Investment Managers.19 The 
strategy was apparently a very successful one, since there was BlueOrchard — the 
second major MFI — on one side, and PGGM that invested forty-one million U.S. 
dollars and 12 percent of their assets, on the other. There was also ABP, which 
invested forty million U.S. dollars. The total invested by the two pension funds was 
20 percent of the total assets of Dexia, a very strong institution with high potential 
profitability. But the whole venture began to break in 2010/2011 with the collapse of 
the MFIs in Andhra, Pradesh, of which Dexia owned a very important part. It was, in 
fact, a drop of 1.85 percent in the MFIs located in Andhra, which had pushed it to 
bankruptcy by 2011. 
Was the fund excessively exposed in Andhra? Not really. At the beginning of the 
crisis, in October 2010, 4.7 percent of the portfolio of Dexia was invested in MFIs 
operating in the region. However, a more rational evaluation was needed for a 
location of eighty-four million inhabitants and a portfolio of outstanding loans of 
around one billion U.S. dollars. Andhra was one of the major markets for MFIs in the 
world, attracting extremely high investments, and not only from Dexia. Its portfolio 
was reduced, but this still did not decrease the investment of capital by those who 
were looking to obtain profits. Investors and holders of mortgage assets or certificates 
from European Union countries were still betting on the profitability of MFIs. 
The yield of Dexia should be observed in the context of an increasing pressure 
on European institutional investors. Insurance companies and banks were hit by 
high-risk capital requirements, and microfinance transformed into a higher-risk 
activity. Meanwhile, pension funds faced more rigorous stress factors in unclassified 
or non-liquid assets, such as microfinance. The most urgent matter of all was the low 
yields offered in financial markets, and within the context of pension funds, Dexia 
deserved a closer look. In the middle of all this, BlueOrchard looked to reform its two 
sibling enterprises, BlueOrchard Finance (bond funds) and BlueOrchard Investments 
(private capital). 
16 Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds  (ABP) is a pension fund of government employees and 
education in Netherlands. In 2012, ABP had 2.8 million participants and assets worth 362.5 billion dollars. 
It is the largest pension fund in this area, and the third on a global level. It was established in 1922.  
17 Voor eenn waardevolle toekomst in Dutch, PGGM, manages pension funds amounting to about 
153 billion dollars. 
18 Dexia makes investments in Greece, but mainly in India, and it was one of the first to fall into 
bankruptcy. Dexia got out of the Dexia Group in order to become Belfius (all the non-performing loans 
went to this bank). 
19 BlueOrchard, also known as Microfinance Investment Managers, boasts as having some of the 
most knowledgeable professionals of finance and dedicated entrepreneurs on a global level (see 
www.blueorchard.com/our-investment-process). 
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It is important to mention that it was major banks that introduced MFIs. That is 
how HSBC organized itself as an NGO for productive projects in education and 
leadership training. An example of such project is Future First-Investing in Our 
Children, which was created in 2006, with an initial investment of ten million dollars 
(HSBC through Society to Heal, Aid, Restore and Educate, SHARE; and Sophia 
College Ex–Students Association, SCESA, within the Raigad district for economic 
activities). A self-help group (SHG)20 program for women was established with the 
objective of providing economic independence for women and generating a dignified 
household existence.  
HSBC created a program to fund MFIs and encourage financial inclusion 
through microcredit. There were many cases when major banks, “too big to fail, too 
big to rescue,” managed to build a niche for themselves by investing into MFIs. The 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, for example, is related to MFIs in Pakistan and Santander 
in Latin America. The evaluation of microcredit is the percentage of the credit geared 
to productive projects. Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA) 
accepted that around 90 percent of microcredit is used for consumption (Bateman 
2011). Thus, most microcredit loans have to be refinanced with new loans since the 
budget of many marginalized families already does not allow for repayment of 
microcredit, plus interest. 
Microcredit loans are made through a joint alliance of NGOs and institutional 
investors (Karim 2011). These hybrid entities, however, need to realize profit, while 
also helping the poor.  To this end, there are arrangements between NGOs and 
multinational corporations, resulting in businesses called social business enterprises 
(SBEs),21 which implement and export the Grameen model. This model occurred 
when the Grameen Bank, the Building Resources Across Communities (BRAC), and 
the Association for Social Advancement (ASA)22 emerged as NGOs and have since 
become exemplary MFIs, providing financial services to the poor on a global level, 
with high profitability (Karim 2011). 
MFIs that start as NGOs are an important and constitutive part of the shadow 
state. They manage large investments through granting small credits to small 
businesses. In Bangladesh alone, there are eighty-six MFIs controlled by NGOs, and 
most of their credit is intended for rural women. The privatization of many state 
activities are now controlled by NGOs, which constitute a quasi-sovereign state in 
themselves and promote economic policies that are consistent with the national plans 
for development. NGOs have become determining factors in managing investment 
funding. 
20 SHG stands for a small voluntary association, preferably of people belonging to the same socio-
economic group. They get together looking to solve common problems through self-help and cooperation. 
The SHG encourages it members to have savings held in banks. The members of the group are usually in 
their twenties. 
21 The Nobel Prize winner, Muhammad Yunus, coined this term to indicate social businesses 
combining profit and social provisioning. These businesses are presented as a win-win situation for both 
corporations and consumers of microcredit. 
22 The largest MFIs are located in Bangladesh: the Grameen Bank, BRAC, ASA. 
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Those behind such NGOs, acting as MFIs and are undoubtedly financial 
banking and non-banking investors, as well as pension and hedge-fund investors. It is 
not surprising that major banks often act through MFIs, granting funds for specific 
objectives or special projects and profiting from marginalized sectors in societies 
across the globe. These investors constitute a shadow (or parallel) financial system in 
economies globally (Girón 2012b). 
 
Reflection 
 
Nowadays, MFIs have a close relationship with banks and institutional investors. They 
are part of structured finance and guarantee profitability from collateral. They are 
mildly regulated entities because they began — and many of them remain — as NGOs, 
and their objective has transformed into granting loans to those who have no access 
to formal funding. Thus, their evaluation will require further discussion. In the 
present paper, I only argued that there is a relationship between MFIs, based 
microcredit, and that they make profits from loaning money to marginalized people. 
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